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Dispute Resolution in Refugee Family Reunion Law. Could Mediation 
Provide a More Therapeutic Solution? 
  




Refugee family reunion is a mechanism whereby refugees residing in a safe host-country may 
apply to have their families, typically residing abroad, join them to live and restart their lives 
in safety. This system operates under international and domestic laws which, in relation to the 
United Kingdom (UK), suffers from frequent tensions between the two. The problems exist due 
to the nature of immigration laws and the political dimension to expansion of the rights of 
individuals to enter and live in the UK; the (often) limited cultural, linguistic and technological 
skills of the applicant; and the practical system of applying for family reunion which exposes 
the applicant to a Byzantine procedural and legal process. In sum, this is a particularly anti-
therapeutic mechanism to provide an individual with their most basic human right – the right 
to a family life. 
 
This paper uses therapeutic jurisprudence as a philosophic approach considering the 
emotional effects of the law. It explores how a more humanitarian direction to judicial 
decision-making and the administration of justice, or alternatively the use of mediation as a 
dispute resolution technique, may provide tangible benefits to applicants and their refugee 
sponsor accessing the legal system in England and Wales.  
 





The families of refugees and individuals granted humanitarian protection status are entitled, as 
a matter of international law, to apply to be reunited with their spouse or parent residing in the 
UK. This system is known as refugee family reunion and enables the refugee, via an application 
process, to be reunited in the new ‘safe’ country with their nuclear and pre-flight family 
members. For the purposes of refugee family reunion, the recognised ‘family’ refers to spouses 
and civil partners, unmarried / same sex partners, and the (biological, adopted and de facto 
adopted) children (under the age of 18) of the refugee.  
 
The process requires the submission of the application, including a bundle of documentary 
evidence supporting the assertion of the family ties before the refugee left their home country. 
The applicants are the family members living away from the refugee (who is known as the 
sponsor in the UK application process). They are required to demonstrate a subsisting 
relationship following the separation of the family, and (advisably) a statement from the 
applicant explaining any gaps in the available evidence or explanations of the family 
circumstances which may not have been included in the application form. This completed and 
submitted application is assessed and verified by a member of the UK civil service (as part of 
the UK’s Home Office government department). This individual is called an Entry Clearance 
Officer (ECO) and it is their job to assess and determine whether the application for refugee 
family reunion should be approved or refused. Where refused, the decision is reviewed by an 
Entry Clearance Manager (ECM). Having confirmed that the application has not satisfied the 
tests for refugee family reunion, a ‘reasons for refusal’ letter is sent to the refugee’s applicant 
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family members. The applicant, often actioned through their sponsor based in the UK, is 
entitled to appeal the decision of the Home Office and this is heard in the First-tier Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) which is part of HM Courts & Tribunals Service. 
 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS – THE DEFINITION OF ANTI-THERAPEUTIC 
PROCESSES 
 
There are many aspects of the refugee family reunion system which are flawed, anti-therapeutic 
and often cause dismay and distress to applicants. We have discussed many of these 
deficiencies in previous papers1 but to give just a few examples there is the current problem 
with the use of ‘country of origin’ information which is used as background materials to guide 
judgements on asylum decisions. It will be remembered that a refugee may be held as such 
because it is unsafe for them to reside in their home country. Such evidence to determine the 
safety of the country would derive (in part at least) from the country of origin documents 
(Country of Origin Information Report and Country Policy and Information Note) as used by 
the Home Office. As recently as 5 December 2018 the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders 
and Immigration noted in his Inspection Report that the country of origin information used in 
decision-making was frequently deficient in its qualitative depth and accuracy (referring to the 
information on Iran); the lack of speed and timeliness in which the situation in some countries 
is changing (in reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)); and an overreliance 
on second-hand English language  sources (in relation to both the DRC and to Turkey).2 Indeed, 
the Chief Inspector noted that he sent the report to the Home Office in August 2018 and it took 
no action on the findings for four months before issuing him with an ‘equivocal response’ to 
the recommendations made.3 This, the Chief Inspector concludes, demonstrates a lack of 
seriousness on the part of the Home Office to consider the Report or the issues raised in it. 
 
This situation, however, is certainly not uncommon. In September 2018 the same Chief 
Inspector, David Bolt, criticised the Home Office for being ‘far too slow’ in acting to 
implement his ten recommendations for improvements to the refugee family reunion system 
from a 2016 report.4 Of the eight recommendations which had yet to be addressed, three are of 
particular significance and which cause delays to decision-making, particularly problematic 
and negative in relation to the impact on the lives of the refugees and their families, and/or 
lead, unnecessarily, to cases having to be solved in the courts. These are 1) a need to improve 
the timeliness of the decision-making of the ECO; 2) an improvement in the quality of decision-
making, record keeping and the ECM quality assurance system and its refusal notices; and 3) 
improvements needed in the collection and interpretation of information relevant to the 
applications. 
 
Another problematic area is the increasing movement towards the requirement for, and use of, 
DNA evidence to establish the connection of the family. Refugee family reunion enables the 
parent who resides in the UK to sponsor their child to apply to join the refugee to live in the 
UK. Typically a birth certificate, as an official state document, will be presented to establish 
parentage. It may be the case that given the non-ideal circumstances through which the 
individual has become a refugee, and perhaps because such documents are not readily sought 
in the refugee’s home country, such a certificate does not exist. To circumvent this problem 
the sponsor may present DNA evidence to establish that he is the parent of the child applicant. 
Whilst this is an accessible route, and it is often valued by the ECO as it involves less sifting 
through documentary evidence to try and establish the sponsor as the applicant’s parent, it is 
not without problems. The current system of refugee family reunion embodies a culture of 
disbelieving, in the first instance, that the sponsor is the applicant's parent and instead requires 
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scientific proof (and the profound negative connotations that this approach establishes). Where 
the ECO rejects an application for refugee family reunion on the basis that parentage cannot 
be established, an anti-therapeutic relationship begins. It necessitates a request by the applicant 
to their sponsor (typically the father) and their mother to undergo a test which may be 
demeaning, could call into question the fidelity of the parent’s relationship, and indeed may 
possibly result in establishing the child applicant as not being the biological child of the 
sponsor. This is potentially devastating to the family unit and may even expose the mother and 
child applicant to danger where it is established that the sponsor is not the biological father. It 
may also be questioned as to what the result may be if the sponsor is not the biological father 
of just one child. It is feasible that the sponsor is applying to be reunited with his spouse and 
children, and if one child is not biologically his, does this child get left behind? Does the 
sponsor accept the child as his and continue to raise the child as his own? How do the siblings 
react to the news that this child does not share the same father as them? Further, how do the 
siblings react to the news that the mother has had a child with another man – this may have 
been through some form of infidelity, although it is not uncommon in family reunion cases for 
the mother to have been a victim of a rape resulting in a pregnancy.  
 
The results of the DNA evidence are issued to those involved in the application. In fairness to 
the Home Office, whilst it is not compelled to offer sensitivity in communicating the rejection 
of an application on this basis, it did provide direction to ECOs. Here the ECO was instructed 
to be aware that it may not be obvious whether the husband or other family members were 
aware of the true relationship of the illegitimacy of the child and that there could be serious 
repercussions for the wife and child were this information to be disclosed. In relation to 
illegitimacy, the ECO was instructed to try and establish the state of the family circumstances 
by interviewing the child's mother discreetly and with sensitivity – a reference to UK Visas 
and Immigration Department to conduct an interview with the sponsor was to be avoided. 
Further, the ECOs were told not to routinely disclose this information to the sponsor or other 
family members, yet due to the UK Data Protection laws, the sponsor and applicants have a 
right to access the personal information about themselves which is held by the Home Office. 
 
It is important to recognise that because the sponsor is not the biological father of the child, but 
the child has been brought up as a member of that family, will not prevent a successful 
application for family reunion. The Home Office has provided instruction to this effect to the 
ECOs reminding them that it is normally appropriate to admit the child under para. 297(i)(f) of 
the Immigration Rules. At some level this appears to be a therapeutically friendly approach. 
Applying Wexler's wine and bottle metaphor,5 the Immigration Rules may necessitate DNA 
evidence and access to it by the parties – which may be problematic, yet the application and 
interpretation of those Rules is an attempt to avoid the harshness and anti-therapeutic potential 
therein. This is until it is recalled that the instruction just noted from the Home Office to ECOs 
was presented in 2015 and, at the time of writing, is no longer provided in the UK government 
website, nor is it presented in any current guidance. Thus, newly appointed ECOs or those who 
are looking for guidance on this matter will not find the instruction or be in a position to 
provide, necessarily, a consistent method of interpreting and communicating news of the 
legitimacy of the child. 
 
3. INFUSING A THERAPUTIC PHILOSOPHY INTO REFUGEE FAMILY 
REUNION THROUGH JUDICIAL INTERVENTION? 
 
Following the refugee’s application to be reunited with their sponsor living in the UK, it is 
assessed and then the result is communicated to the applicant. The sponsor, where this process 
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has been successful, will make arrangements with their family members, often assisted by an 
organisation such as the Red Cross, for the family members to leave the country in which they 
presently reside and enter the UK to live with the sponsor. In the event that the application is 
unsuccessful, the applicant may appeal and/or make a resubmission (in an attempt to rectify 
the deficiencies in the previous application). However, there may exist a suspicion, often borne 
out of experience of users of the system, that once an ECO has rejected an application, further 
applications may be similarly (almost systematically) rejected. The appeal route may be the 
chosen method by the applicant as the case is heard in the Tribunal before a judge, and by 
appearing before a judge and being allowed to have their situation and circumstances 
explained, the client’s application may be accepted.6 Yet the legal process, following the 
negative experience of the first administrative stage, may not necessarily provide the positive 
and therapeutic dispute resolution forum envisaged by the applicant or their refugee sponsor 
(who often will be the party in attendance to offer information, explanation and evidence in the 
case). Evidence of proceedings of the parties from court cases and judicial processes is difficult 
to obtain due to reporting restrictions of those in the court room. However, anecdotal evidence 
from practitioners and clients obtained over several years has provided many examples of anti-
TJ practices in immigration cases. This includes child applicants being subject to practices 
which were interpreted as bullying from state-representatives. Ineffective control of courtroom 
procedures by the judge, members of the judiciary with a dismissive attitude, those who often 
fail to make or maintain eye-contact with individuals in the courtroom, judges with a passive 
aggressive / disapproving attitude to caseworkers and claimants, and ineffective legal 
representation of the client lead to a very negative experience and poor perception of access to 
justice. 
 
It would be wrong to suggest that all judges who hear refugee family reunion cases do so in an 
anti-therapeutic manner. Many do apply the interpersonal skills based on the psychology of 
procedural justice (a theory heavily relied upon by TJ pioneers in the context of therapeutic 
judging).7 Meaningful and effective interactions that form therapeutic judging are characterised 
by empathy, including relating events to the participants’ lives; acknowledging emotional 
responses to cases and events; possessing a sense of care, compassion and respect to enforce 
validation; acting in a trustworthy manner and credibly; and being aware of their own bias (for 
example in relation to appearance). The judges could also demonstrate respect through 
referring to the parties by the designation ‘sir’ or ‘madam’, using effective body language 
techniques including maintaining eye contact, listening carefully and attentively to the parties, 
they can speak slowly and ensure the parties (especially refugees whose understanding of 
English may be less strong than other parties to the court) understand the proceedings and the 
questions being asked / evidence being sought. The judges can speak effectively to the parties, 
refraining from the use of paternalistic tones, sarcasm and by not interrupting the answers given 
by the refugee or rushing them through a response. This also involves an acceptance, and the 
exercise of active listening and an appreciation of the judge’s non-verbal forms of 
communication. Matters as simple as whether the judge looks interested in the responses of the 
refugee, their tone of voice and whether they take notes during evidence giving to demonstrate 
interest and listening can have significantly positive effects on the administration of justice.  
 
Finally, the judge can enter into a conversation with the refugee and Home Office 
representative. Here the First-tier Tribunal (which hears all cases relating to immigration and 
asylum matters, including deportation cases) would adapt to a more problem-solving court 
approach, as advocated by Goldberg8 whereby rather than the traditional feature of the courts 
resolving legal disputes (such as whether the ECO had correctly applied the procedures for 
determining whether to accept or decline the application for family reunion), they would 
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instead have the goal of resolving the underlying problem of why the application failed, the 
system of a re-application or an appropriately explained reason for refusal letter had not been 
communicated with the parties. We have argued elsewhere the positive examples from the 
judiciary who attempt to use their powers of interpretation and interactions with court 
personnel and litigants to minimise the negative effects of the law and legal process. This we 
referred to as ‘judicial Canutism’.9 However, this is not a policy adopted by all members of the 
judiciary and it would be concerning if it were left to the sensibilities of the judiciary to mitigate 
against the defects in the legal system and the policies which underpin its development. 
 
The nature of refugee family reunion is based on the assessment and application of legal 
principles, but if this legal outcome is the focus, the therapeutic outcome may be lost. To deny 
an applicant the most fundamental right to reside with their family should be a decision taken 
with the upmost seriousness and only be denied in circumstances where the applicant has not 
been able to demonstrate the family ties. This relates directly to the anti-therapeutic nature of 
the removal of legal aid through the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 and its implications for DNA testing. Not infrequently, the sponsor in the UK has to use 
DNA evidence to establish the family relationship, yet the evidence accepted by the Home 
Office (through the ECO) has to be from a list of approved immigration DNA suppliers (since 
2014 the Home Office ceased DNA testing (and paying for these tests)). These suppliers 
typically charge approximately £800 for the test (Briefing Paper on Refugee Family Reunion 
– GMIAU10 which can, obviously, involve more than one child) and will have to be paid by 
the sponsor/applicants unless a successful Exceptional Case Funding application is made 
(which have fallen significantly following the removal of the Home Office paying for testing). 
For instance, Bolt11 reports the increases of refusals of family reunion applications between 
2013 and 2015 to be from 15% to 46% for Eritrean applicants; 17% to 80% for Somalian 
applicants and from 9% to 34%, 35% and 36% for Sudanese, Syrian and Iranian applications 
respectively.12  
 
The consequence is that many sponsors are denied the right to be reunited with their families 
because of the application of rules without an effective means of reviewing the decision. Judges 
can assist in these circumstances not by changing the rules under which they have to operate 
as this would extend the doctrine of statutory interpretation beyond the limits as permitted even 
via a purposive or teleological approach. A therapeutic approach must occur within the 
constraints of the legal system. Rather the judges may act as a facilitator for collaboration 
between the parties, to encourage participants and stakeholders to work in establishing the 
remediation of underlying problems, and to adopt a commonsensical rather than legalistic 
approach to the resolution of the problem. TJ recognises that legal processes will have an 
impact in any event, and that the impact can be harnessed to achieve a positive outcome.13 
Therapeutic outcomes should be sought so that they do not undermine standards of good court 
performance, as articulated in Trial Court Performance Standards.14 
 
The inconsistency of approach by the judiciary in cases involving refugees, and evidence of a 
lack of appreciation of the problems experienced by refugees and how these may manifest 
themselves in terms of, for example, testimony in court proceedings, remains. In a case heard 
by the Court of Appeal (R(PA)(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department)15 it was 
held that adverse findings made by the First-tier Tribunal judge (who considered the refugee 
as having ‘cynically manipulated’ the legal system and the use of medical evidence accepted 
in court) would not be displaced merely because the judge did not have the benefit of 
knowledge that the refugee was suffering from cognitive impairment as proven through 
psychiatric and psychological evidence. Further issues here which are troubling is that the case 
 6 
involved a Kurdish child and one who had been smuggling goods including alcohol across the 
Iran boarder with Iraq. Despite evidence being presented as to the commonplace nature of this 
situation, and the use of protection rackets to commandeer participants, the Tribunal accepted 
the Home Office Country Information Reports as being more authoritative than such in-country 
expertise on the political and pragmatic nature of operations. A postscriptum in the case 
remarked on the overly long judgments from First-tier Tribunals which also contain 
unnecessary detail. These, it continues, cause problems with consistency and cogency. This is 
compounded by the First-tier Tribunal which conducts many cases as closed hearings with no 
reporting or public gallery. These points are presented here to demonstrate a number of 
problems with the current judicial system involving refugees and how a different approach is 
needed to avoid some of the worst examples of poor practice and unhelpful determinacy in 
cases of the upmost importance – reuniting families and respect for family life as a human 
right. 
 
4. MEDIATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
 
At present, a refugee sponsor and his family applicants who find the application fails in some 
way is informed of this through a letter from the ECO (as agreed by the ECM). In reality, many 
of these read as though copy and pasted from a template and frequently they are written in 
accusatory language and without definitive instruction as to what the applicant may do to 
rectify the defects. For example, in a case of which the authors have experience, a client was 
refused family reunion. As part of his family’s application, in the absence of a birth certificate, 
the applicant included a Baptismal Certificate. The response from the ECO was ‘… this is not 
an official record of your birth… it is therefore of no evidential value as evidence that you are 
related as stated to your sponsor.’ Further in the letter was reference to a photograph included 
to demonstrate the pre-family ties between the sponsor and the applicant. Again, the response 
from the ECO was ‘I am unable to identify either you or your sponsor in this picture and as 
such I am not satisfied that you have ever met your sponsor in person’ (authors’ emphasis). 
The letter of refusal concludes ‘… I am not satisfied that you are the child of a parent who 
currently has refugee status granted under the Immigration Rules in the UK or that you were 
part of the family unit of a person granted asylum…’ It is important to recall at this point that 
this letter is drafted to a child and one which is living away from the person (that they at least) 
consider to be their father. It is understandable how a civil servant needs to consider the 
evidence supporting an application. They may also reasonably conclude that such evidence is 
inconclusive or is not acceptable to support evidence of the family connection. However it is 
in the wording of the response, the allegation of deception about the family connection, the 
lack of engagement with the applicant about the evidence or what evidence is required to satisfy 
the test for family reunion which makes the rejection so unfair, negative and anti-therapeutic. 
 
There is also little opportunity to effectively challenge the decision in a conversation with the 
ECO, and the refugee’s family are faced with a choice. They may accept the decision and live 
apart (or the family may attempt to make the journey to the UK and claim asylum in their own 
right). They may make a re-submission of the original application and try to remedy the defects 
so as to satisfy the ECO as to the veracity of the documentary evidence submitted along with 
their application. They may submit a ‘fresh’ application and seek guidance to improve on the 
first submission and hope a different ECO may conclude differently from that of the ECO in 
the first application. Finally, the applicants may choose to appeal the decision of the ECO and 
have this challenge heard by a judge (in the First-tier Tribunal). Litigation, then, is the only 
real option in which to have the decision of the ECO challenged by an independent adjudicator. 
This form of dispute resolution is not necessarily the most effective, impartial and effective 
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means of resolving disputes in refugee family reunion cases (as noted above). However, at 
present and in relation to refugee family reunion, alternative forms of dispute resolution are 
not available. 
 
The training of judges in the UK is of a high standard and is likely comparable to those around 
the world. There is instruction to them on helping litigants and particularly litigants in person 
(those not legally represented at hearings). Of course, whilst mindful of the needs of all 
litigants, the judges are not permitted to assist the litigant to make legal arguments or on how 
to ensure documents to be relied upon have been submitted correctly. Further, there is anecdotal 
evidence of judges, as noted above, acting in anti-therapeutic ways when dealing with cases 
involving refugees see Marson, Ferris and Kawalek;16 and Washington Post.17 
 
In recent research, judges in the UK’s only ‘drug court’ were found to be acting in a largely 
therapeutic way (at least to the best of their abilities), but this was in the context of laws and 
methods of operating which were not conducive to a TJ-compliant philosophy.18 It replicated 
effectively the distinction between Wexler’s ‘wine’ and ‘bottle’ metaphor19 where the judiciary 
were attempting, of their own volition, to minimise the harmful effects of the UK’s laws when 
dealing with individuals facing criminal charges due to their relationship with, and use of, 
illegal drugs.20 Therefore, whilst it is undeniable that individual and even groups of like-
minded judges will share information and act in a TJ friendly manner, this is not widespread 
practice and TJ principles are not fully included in the training received by a lawyer or judge. 
 
Therefore, what we are proposing in this paper is a movement away from litigation as a 
mechanism to resolve the dispute between the sponsor, their applicant family members and the 
Home Office which has refused the application for those family members to join their sponsor 
in the UK. There has not been the movement, as seen internationally in relation to family courts 
in the US, of a shifting philosophy to creative, supportive, collaborative and interest-based 
dispute resolution processes.21 Further, the gamut of forms of mediation available have not yet 
surfaced in relation to disputes of this nature, such as psycho-educational programs; non-
confidential dispute resolution and assessment; early neutral evaluations;22 collaborative law;23 
and cooperative negotiation agreements.24 Thus, significant limitations apply to the forms that 
resolution of disputes here may take, despite the very broad nature and complexity present in 
the cases. Importantly, the services noted above are available through the court services and 
thus would not incorporate the costs and difficulties that may be present where dispute 
resolution mechanisms are administered through private organisations. 
 
What is needed in the UK is a system of adjudicating refugee family reunion disputes which 
adopts a new way of thinking about the resolution of problems of applications. An appreciation 
of the non-ideal circumstances refugees find themselves in when travelling to the UK and that 
their families may lack coherent documents regarding parentage, marriages and contacts. It has 
always seemed somewhat incredulous that the ECO will accept a record of telephone 
communications from a mobile telephone number associated with the sponsor and a second 
number associated with the family member (spouse and/or child) without any details of the 
nature of the calls or indeed whether they are genuinely linked to the persons claimed. 
However, they will often find fault with, and thereby reject the veracity of, documents which 
may have been defaced (a birth certificate may have been written on by the applicant when an 
administrative error has been identified after the issue of it and they have sought fit to provide 
a correction), or those issued for the purposes of an application (such as producing a birth 
certificate of a child which had, previous to the application for family reunion, been 
unnecessary and is not as ubiquitous a document as may be the case in Western jurisdictions) 
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which are subsequently held as non-contemporaneous. Where an ECO is faced with non-
contemporaneous documents they frequently conclude that these are of ‘little evidential 
evidence’ and necessitate a fresh application which supplements this with DNA evidence.25 
These problems are systemic and enable the rejection of applications without an examination 
of the underlying problems of why the issue has led to a challenge in the courts. There is a lack 
of mutual interest in examining the problems within an application and understanding how the 
applicant and the ECO working collaboratively could resolve these. It would further be helpful 
for the parties to move away from the adversarial system entrenched in the UK legal system, 
one which has been engrained in students who then become lawyers and ultimately progress to 
sit as a judge. It is understandable how, when the applicants, through the refugee sponsor, 
appoint a lawyer to fight their case against the ECO who, through the Home Office, appoints 
their lawyers to argue the decision was correctly made, problems in the system remain. The 
lawyers trained in the English adversarial system of law will battle on the points of law with 
the aim to win, to push their advantages regardless of the negative effects on the opposing 
party.26 A movement to problem-solving and collaboration is needed. As explained by 
Edwards27 when referring to family cases of divorce, there lies  
 
‘the harm that engaging in adversarial tactics can bring—harm in the use of cross-
examination on vulnerable28 witnesses, in the expense of engaging in prolonged 
discovery, and the ultimate harm created when there are winners and losers in each case 
leading to mounting distrust and alienation…’29 
 
Of course, mediation as a dispute resolution tool has been subject to critical appraisal and is 
certainly not universally popular.30 Nolan-Haley,31 for instance, identified the trajectory in the 
US of mediation to a new form of arbitration (referred to as ‘legal mediation’) which facilitated 
the development of ‘… aggressive behaviors of lawyers as mediation advocates, operating in 
a weak ethical regime that permits some forms of deception…’32 Here the lawyers consider the 
mediation process to be one of a private judicial settlement conference which results in their 
adversarial behaviour.33 
 
Mediation is not being suggested to enable applicants to avoid the scrutiny of the legal system. 
Nor is it presented as a means to circumvent the application of strict rules on family reunion. 
Rather it empowers parties to hear each other’s arguments,34 to engage in a conversation where 
issues may be explored and solutions considered. It removes the powerlessness felt by many 
refugee sponsors, typically male (in the case of fleeing war or when the family face persecution 
the male is often the strongest and most able to reach a safe country and then send for the family 
to join him) and the patriarch of the family who is unable to unilaterally provide for the 
reunification of the family. It allows for the Home Office to explain in greater depth why an 
application has to fail but perhaps explore methods of ensuring the safety of the family living 
abroad and provide reference to services to help the refugee manage the transition to acceptance 
of the decision. This mechanism may also help to integrate the needs of the family more 
sensitively than a ruling issued by a judge and based on arguments having been orchestrated 
by the team of lawyers involved. The refugee sponsor would be placed at the heart of the 
process and the resolution of the dispute rather than a largely passive bystander awaiting the 
decision from a process many will not understand. They may also be better able to accept the 
decision made as their needs and interests have been a central component of the process. They 
will feel better able to explain this to their rejected family members, who cannot join them in 
the UK, and be able to begin a conversation with them about the defects in the application and 
what happens next in their lives.  
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Arguments have been presented, albeit in respect of mediation’s use in family proceedings, 
which advocate for the benefits it provides to emotional and potentially vulnerable litigants.35 
These characteristics chime with the refugee clients seeking reunification with their family 
members and therefore parallels may be drawn from the findings of previous research with 
families using mediation. According to Beck and Sales,36 mediation provides benefits for both 
litigants and the legal system generally. For the refugee sponsors who are seeking to be reunited 
in their new ‘home’ country with their families (who are often living abroad), mediation may 
benefit the claimant/litigant through empowerment and self-determination.37 This is 
manifested in the mediator who has the ability to help the parties (the refugee and the Home 
Office) to reach a cooperative solution to the dispute. Hence, if the concern of the Home Office 
relates to the contemporaneous nature of the documentation presented by the refugee claimant 
of their relationship with their sponsor, mediation could enable the refugee to take control of 
this problem, ascertain exactly what is needed and present this for the satisfaction of the Home 
Office representative (and thereby enable a conversation to be initiated which allows more 
effective communication between the parties than currently exists). Or, in the absence of this 
material, evidence on the country of origin and the reason for the non-existence of such material 
could be explored along with the expert and independent verification of these explanations 
which may lead to a thorough examination of the matter to be concluded.38 The value of the 
ability for the airing of grievances, which is not readily enabled in court proceedings, and for 
each side to communicate and for thorough explanations to be issued and discussed is 
invaluable to remove the sense of unfairness that currently exists when an application for 
refugee family reunion is refused. Where the reunion application must fail, perhaps for failures 
due to policy or the application of the law, given the nature of the communication avenues 
available this can be explained to the refugee sponsor more effectively than through a letter or 
court case and this in turn is more likely to lead to acceptance, compliance and will limit the 
psychological damage that may accompany an unexplained decision which will otherwise be 
perceived as being unfair. And, evidently, mediation is a far less adversarial environment than 
a court case – being litigated by advocates which removes the control from the refugee, may 
lead to arguments being presented which the refugee does not understand or which they would 
not raise, and could further lead to information which they feel is relevant (but which may not 
be part of the legal issue in question) being not presented. This again, cumulatively, instils a 
negative and anti-therapeutic feeling to the legal and administrative process of refugee family 
reunion. 
 
In respect of the benefits for the legal system, by removing refugee family reunion claims from 
a legal setting presided by a judge to mediation, where the mediator might be a mental health 
professional or someone specialising in conflict and dispute resolution techniques, many of the 
potential anti-therapeutic effects of the traditional dispute resolution system can be avoided. 
Further, and a benefit often attributed to all forms of alternative dispute resolution, is the speed 
and inexpensive nature of mediation over the court system. Many months are likely to pass 
between the applicant being refused their reunification with the refugee sponsor and the appeal 
to this decision being heard in the Tribunal (and once legal aid39 or pro bono legal 
representation has been secured). Mediation removes this tier and allows the parties to 
determine issues and reach a resolution far quicker – and generally with less need for lawyers.40 
Finally, mediation may provide a learning opportunity for the Home Office (as decision-
makers) to understand and thus deal with the root causes of problems and conflicts affecting 
applications for refugee family reunion, and to be better able to manage and mitigate their worst 





The reunion of the family is a central component in a refugee rebuilding their life following 
the trauma associated with refugee status. The current administrative requirements of the 
application procedure may place substantial barriers to successful reunification. The online 
process requires technical know-how and a relatively high proficiency in English to be able to 
successfully navigate through the system. Many applicants lack these skills. Where 
applications fail, the applicant is faced with submitting a revised or fresh claim (of which many 
are unsuccessful) or a legal challenge may be made. The legal process is fraught with hurdles 
for the applicant and the possibilities of a lack of understanding of the decision, a sense of 
helplessness for the applicant, and an arrangement where the applicant is challenging the state 
through an adversarial system. Despite the best efforts of some therapeutically-minded judges, 
the practice and the rules under which decisions are made is not conducive to resolving the 
underlying problems in the administration of refugee family reunion. They are about the correct 
application of a set of broken rules. Mediation could enable the engagement, problem-solving, 
and collaborative approach which would help to establish genuine and deserving cases. It 
would also reduce the burden on an already stretched judicial process trying to deal with the 
consequences of an increased rate of refused applications and the legal appeals this brings. 
Alternative forms of dispute resolution must be brought into effect to stop the deep-seated anti-
therapeutic effects experienced in applications for refugee family reunion. 
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